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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, the Cyberspace has seen an increasing number of attacks coming from botnets 
using the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) architecture. Peer-to-Peer botnets use a decentralized Command & Control 
architecture. Moreover, a large number of such botnets already exist, and newer versions- which 
significantly differ from their parent bot- are also discovered practically every year. In this work, the 
authors propose and implement a novel hybrid framework for detecting P2P botnets in live network 
traffic by integrating Neural Networks with Bayesian Regularization. Bayesian Regularization helps in 
achieving better generalization of the dataset, thereby enabling the detection of botnet activity even of 
those bots which were never used in training the Neural Network. Hence such a framework is suitable 
for detection of newer and unseen botnets in live traffic of a network. This was verified by testing the 
Framework on test data unseen to the Detection module (using untrained botnet dataset), and the authors 
were successful in detecting this activity with an accuracy of 99.2 %. 
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1. PEER-TO-PEER BOTNETS 
A Bot is a program written to covertly access the machine on which it is installed, to allow an 
unauthorized user to remotely control the targeted system (victim) through communication protocols 
(IRC, HTTP or P2P). A network of such compromised end-hosts under the remote command of a bot-
master (or a bot-herder) is called a botnet. The types of attacks that the network gets exposed to are 
enormous, considering the capability of the bots to autonomously and automatically run on the host 
computers. Table 1 lists the attacks that are possible to deploy using Botnets. 
Table 1. Attacks possible with botnets 
Attack Description 
Distributed Denial 
of Service 
Overloading and preventing a single system (hosting a critical application) from 
servicing legitimate requests 
Adware Active advertising of a commercial offering without the user’s permission or 
awareness 
Spyware Sending information to the botmasters about a victim’s activities – typically 
credit card numbers, passwords and other information that can be sold on the 
black market. 
Email Spam Flooding people with mails disguised as messages from people but containing 
advertisements or malicious links 
Fast-flux A DNS technique used by botnets to hide malware delivery and phishing sites 
behind an ever-changing network of compromised hosts acting as proxies 
Scareware Inducing users to buy a rogue anti-virus to regain access of their corrupted 
system 
 
Botnets using IRC as the channel for Command and Control (C & C) are the ones which can be detected 
most easily. This is because of the characteristics of the communication channel that IRC provides. 
Only one central C & C server exists in an IRC based Botnet, and if the server is incapacitated, the 
entire Botnet is taken down. This single point of failure in IRC botnets led to the emergence of 'smarter' 
Botnets, such as those which use P2P architecture for Botnet communication. P2P architecture for 
botnets, shown in figure 1b, is tolerant to the single point of failure as any node in the P2P network can 
act as both a client and a server. Even if one or two malicious nodes in the P2P Botnet are taken down, 
the gaps in the network overlay are filled by readjusting the architecture and the network continues to 
operate under the control of the attacker, shown in figure 1b. 
Although P2P bots were on the rise since early 21st century, with the variants of Agobot, Spybot and 
Sinit launching many exploits on the internet, the task of detecting and mitigating them remains a 
challenge. Table 2 shows a timeline of P2P Bots, which are continuing to evolve till date introducing 
complex evolutionary mechanisms to make themselves robust: 
Table 2. A timeline of P2P Botnet 
Year of 
detection 
Name of P2P Bot Technology used 
2002 Agobot, Spybot Early botnets exploiting P2P architecture 
2003 Sinit Finding peers through random scanning 
2004 Phatbot Based on WASTE – small VPN-style network with RSA 
public keys 
2006 Spamthru; Nugache Advances in custom backup protocol and peer location 
2007 Peacomm; Storm Exploiting existing Kademlia network 
2008 Conficker; Sality Dictionary attacks on administrative passwords; 
Incorporation of evolutionary rootkit functions 
2009 TDL4; Zeus Encrypted communication and infecting MBR of 
victims; Man in the browser keystroke logging and Form 
Garbing 
2010 Waledac; Kelihos; Stuxnet Email Spam; Theft of bitcoins; Programmable Logic 
Controller rootkit 
2013 Wordpress Brute-force crack administrative credentials 
 
Even though the P2P architecture introduces latency into the communication network, it enables the 
Botnet to remain hidden. When a bot receives a message, it randomly searches for the next bot in the 
P2P network and passes the message onto the peer, thereby giving away very less information about 
the Botnet infrastructure to the outside world.  
Recently social networks have also been used as a medium for commanding the bots by the bot-masters. 
Users of a social networks will generally trust the links and messages coming from the network. This 
fact was exploited by the Svelta malware (Wood 2010) where the Botnet used a twitter account named 
upd3t3, and commands were sent as tweets from this account in base64 encoded form. The infected 
bots were the followers of this twitter account, which were programmed to convert the base64 encoded 
tweets into commands to be executed.  
There have also been anonymous groups which asked for volunteers to opt-in to becoming a part of a 
politically-based Botnet activity. One group in 2010, comprising of 30,000 bots, announced its support 
for Wikileaks by launching DDoS attacks against anti-Wikileaks companies. (BBC News 2012) 
Botnet activity was also found in mobile devices, smartphones and tablet PCs in the recent times. Zeus 
was observed on many Nokia phones which use Symbian OS, which defeated the online banking two-
step authentication by monitoring the SMS sent by the bank. (Apvrille 2012)  
Thus P2P Botnet detection and mitigation is proving to be an extremely important area of research both 
on the desktop and the mobile platforms. Research on how they recruit bot members, form the botnet 
and finally attack is given in (Wang, et al. 2009).  
In this paper the authors propose a novel hybrid framework by integrating Neural Networks with a 
Bayesian Regularization pre-processing module. Bayesian Regularization helps in achieving better 
generalization of the dataset, thereby enabling the detection of botnet activity of even those bots which 
were never used in training the Neural Network. This means that such a framework is suitable for 
detection of newer and unseen botnets in live traffic of a network, as evident by the results of this 
research. Owing to the generalization provided by Bayesian Regularization, the authors were successful 
in detecting activity of untrained malicious bots with an accuracy of 99.2 %. This model was then 
integrated into a Java API, which can be used as a pre-processor module for any Intrusion Detection 
System for the real-time detection of any botnet traffic on the network. 
 
Figure 1:a) How P2P Bot spreads 
 
Figure 1: b) Architecture of a P2P Botnet 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The previous work done on P2P botnet detection is 
described in the next section (section 2). Section 3 describes in detail the methodology of the author’s 
experiment and gives a description of the algorithm used to identify the botnet activity, and section 4 
describes the experimental setup that was used to conduct the research work. The paper concludes with 
the results and future scope of this work in section 5. 
2. RELATED WORK ON P2P BOTNET DETECTION 
Authors in (Yen and Reiter 2010) differentiate the network flow records based on certain features related 
to traffic volume and categorize them as P2P malicious and benign. They also present how the plotters 
could change their behavior to evade their detection technique, which was seen in observing the 
behavior of Nugache, which is known to randomly change its behavior. 
Researchers (Schoof and Koning 2007) report on their work on detecting Sinit and Nugache that these 
bots communicate on the same port. Also a large number of destination unreachable error messages and 
connection reset error messages can be observed. But bots which encrypt their payloads will disable 
this technique from working.  
Researchers (Dittrich and Dietrich 2008) explain the challenges and features when dealing with 
Nugache P2P botnet.  Authors in (Stover, et al. 2007)conclude that it is impossible for a static Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) to detect Nugache traffic. The authors' analysis of Storm concludes that the 
Storm bot can be detected by configuring an IDS to find the configuration file used by the bot. But it is 
difficult to distinguish between legitimate P2P communication and Storm bot. 
Authors (Holz, et al. 2008)develop ways to mitigate the Storm worm and introduce an active 
measurement technique to enumerate the number of infected hosts by reverse engineering of the bot's 
binary executable, in order to identify the function which generates the key that is used for searching 
other infected machines and bots.  
(Stewart February 2007) reports an in depth analysis of Peacomm and how it spams large number of 
emails to many accounts holding an executable attachment.  
Authors in (Grizzard, et al. 2007) retrieve the hashes of malware and use it for locating a zombie nodes' 
activities in a P2P network. They argue that if a peer searches for a hash of a malware, it must be a 
zombie.  
Authors in (Nagaraja, et al. 2010) devise techniques to localize Botnet members based on the unique 
communication patterns arising from the structured overlay topologies used for command and control. 
They examine if ISPs can detect the efficient communication structures of P2P bots. Their algorithm 
isolates this based on the information about which pairs of nodes communicate with one another.  
Liu et al. in (Liu, et al. 2010) propose adaptive mechanisms to detect a variety of P2P Botnets. But their 
solutions can be applied only in the attacking stage of the Botnet. Their study was successful on Trojan 
Peacomm, but the implications are not clear when dealing with other categories/types of Botnets.  
Authors in (Tarng, et al. 2011) use P2P flow identification techniques to monitor and filter traffic flows, 
isolating the hosts when they connect to the Botnet. Their work uses Bayes Classifier and Neural 
Network classifier to detect the IP address of the infected systems.  
Researchers in (Gu, et al. 2008)present a framework named BotMiner, which detects both centralized 
IRC and P2P botnets using an anomaly based detection system. The assumption in this regard is that 
bots are coordinated malware that exhibit similar communication patterns and behaviours. BotMiner 
targets a group of compromised systems belonging to a monitored network, whereas it fails to detect a 
simple system which might be a part of a Botnet which is not in the monitored network’s zone. 
Researchers (Noh, et al. 2009) detect Botnet activity by detecting similar flows occurring between 
groups of hosts in the network on a regular basis. Flows with similar behaviors are labeled into groups, 
and a transition model of the grouped flows is constructed using a probability matrix. The authors 
compute a 'likelihood ratio' and use that ratio for detection of bots.  
A self-organization map algorithm was applied by authors in (Langin, et al. 2009) to detect P2P Botnets, 
in which they assume that there would be numerous failed connection attempts from exterior to interior 
in firewall. 
Most of the previous research work has focused on detecting a specific botnet activity. Such methods 
were not reported to be successful in detecting bots whose traffic characteristics were not used in 
training the machine learning algorithm. Clearly, it is seen that using a machine learning based approach 
is superior in detecting malicious traffic when compared to a traditional signature based approach as 
the bot masters redesign the bots from time to time, and the functionality, behavior etc. of the botnet 
varies quite significantly with each new version of the bot. Moreover previous works have not seen 
much research on deploying the detection module in a real-time scenario to monitor and mitigate botnet 
activity on a network.  
3. Methodology  
3.1 Feature Extraction  
Machine learning algorithms require appropriate ‘features’ as inputs in order to train models. For this 
research, samples of certain P2P bots were deployed on a test-bed (as described in the next section) and 
network trace files (pcaps) were obtained. These trace files were then used for feature extraction using 
an Open-source tool Netmate (Netmate 2011). Netmate gives its output in the form of ‘flows’ (defined 
by the tuple <Source IP, Source port, Destination IP, Destination port, protocol>) and extracts more 
than forty features applicable to each of flow. The features extracted by it are listed below. All features 
are represented as integers unless otherwise stated. 
Table 3: Description of Features used 
Feature Description of the feature 
Srcip Source ip address (string) 
Srcport Source port number 
Dstip Destination ip address (string) 
Dstport Destination port number 
Proto Protocol (ie. TCP = 6, UDP = 17) 
total_fpackets Total packets in  forward direction 
total_fvolume Total bytes in  forward direction 
total_bpackets Total packets in  backward direction 
total_bvolume Total bytes in  backward direction 
min_fpktl Size of  smallest packet sent in  forward direction (in bytes) 
mean_fpktl Mean size of packets sent in  forward direction (in bytes) 
max_fpktl Size of  largest packet sent in  forward direction (in bytes) 
std_fpktl Standard deviation from  mean of  packets sent in  forward direction (in bytes) 
min_bpktl Size of  smallest packet sent in  backward direction (in bytes) 
mean_bpktl Mean size of packets sent in  backward direction (in bytes) 
max_bpktl Size of  largest packet sent in  backward direction (in bytes) 
std_bpktl Standard deviation from  mean of  packets sent in  backward direction (in bytes) 
min_fiat Minimum amount of time between two packets sent in  forward direction (in microseconds) 
mean_fiat Mean amount of time between two packets sent in  forward direction (in microseconds) 
max_fiat Maximum amount of time between two packets sent in  forward direction (in microseconds) 
std_fiat 
Standard deviation from  mean amount of time between two packets sent in  forward direction (in 
microseconds) 
min_biat Minimum amount of time between two packets sent in  backward direction (in microseconds) 
mean_biat Mean amount of time between two packets sent in  backward direction (in microseconds) 
max_biat Maximum amount of time between two packets sent in  backward direction (in microseconds) 
std_biat 
Standard deviation from  mean amount of time between two packets sent in  backward direction (in 
microseconds) 
Duration Duration of  flow (in microseconds) 
min_active Minimum amount of time that  flow was active before going idle (in microseconds) 
mean_active Mean amount of time that  flow was active before going idle (in microseconds) 
max_active Maximum amount of time that  flow was active before going idle (in microseconds) 
std_active Standard deviation from  mean amount of time that  flow was active before going idle (in microseconds) 
min_idle Minimum time a flow was idle before becoming active (in microseconds) 
mean_idle Mean time a flow was idle before becoming active (in microseconds) 
max_idle Maximum time a flow was idle before becoming active (in microseconds) 
std_idle Standard devation from  mean time a flow was idle before becoming active (in microseconds) 
sflow_fpackets Average number of packets in a sub flow in  forward direction 
sflow_fbytes Average number of bytes in a sub flow in  forward direction 
sflow_bpackets Average number of packets in a sub flow in  backward direction 
sflow_bbytes Average number of packets in a sub flow in  backward direction 
fpsh_cnt Number of times  PSH flag was set in packets travelling in  forward direction (0 for UDP) 
bpsh_cnt Number of times  PSH flag was set in packets travelling in  backward direction (0 for UDP) 
furg_cnt Number of times  URG flag was set in packets travelling in  forward direction (0 for UDP) 
burg_cnt Number of times  URG flag was set in packets travelling in  backward direction (0 for UDP) 
total_fhlen Total bytes used for headers in forward direction. 
total_bhlen Total bytes used for headers in backward direction. 
 
For these experiments, the authors removed the first four features (Source IP, Source port, Destination 
IP, Destination port) as they are totally dependent on the network configuration on which the bots are 
deployed. Information Gain Attribute Evaluation was done using the Ranker Algorithm in order find 
the most influential features of the entire feature set. This method evaluates the worth of an attribute by 
measuring the information gain with respect to the class, where Information Gain is described by the 
following equation: 
Information Gain (Class, Attribute) = H(Class) - H(Class | Attribute). 
The following were the first 15 in the list, with their Information gain shown in the first column.  
Table 4: Features selected using Information Gain Ranking Algorithm 
Rank Feature 
0.814 total_bhlen 
0.81 std_bpktl 
0.7886 fpsh_cnt 
0.7751 total_fhlen 
0.7654 bpsh_cnt 
0.7568 min_biat 
0.7438 min_fiat 
0.7182 max_bpktl 
0.7104 sflow_fbytes 
0.6802 sflow_fpackets 
0.6761 mean_fiat 
0.6625 total_bpackets 
0.6502 max_fiat 
0.6459 mean_biat 
0.6427 max_fpktl 
 
3.2 Bayesian Regularized Neural Network 
Artificial Neural network is a very useful tool for Machine Learning which has been applied in several 
scenarios. It has been applied to many cases such as text pronunciation example trained by a back 
propagation neural network (Franco, et al. 1997). It has also found many applications in the field of 
pattern recognition (Carpenter and Grossberg 1988). In predictive modeling, application of the 
Artificial Neural Networks has the advantage of being able to capture relationships which are highly 
complex.  
Neural network architecture, A, consists of a specification of the number of layers, the number of units 
in each layer, the type of activation function performed by each unit, and the available connections 
between the units. Values for the weight, w, is assigned to the connections in the network, the weighted 
input, x, sum is mapped with y1(x; w, A), the predicted value of the output. The distance of the predicted 
value to the training set is measured by some error function. The error for the entire data set is commonly 
taken to be 
𝐸(𝐷 , 𝑤, 𝐴) =  ∑
[𝑦1(𝑥𝑚;𝑤;𝐴)−𝑦𝑚]2
2
𝑁
𝑚=0
     (1) 
Here E is the error function, often called as Mean of Squares of errors (MSE), y1 is the predicted output, 
x is the input and m is the instance of the data. Here y represents the output data and N represent the 
total data set. 
It has been observed in literature that back propagation neural networks used to train the neural network 
model give high reliability (Zhang, et al. 2001). The back propagation learning algorithm uses a gradient 
search technique to minimize the mean square error of the output of the network.  
The parameters of the back propagation networks are generally set by trial and error. Reserved test data 
is used to assess its generalization ability (or the cross-validation ability) (MacKay 1992). These 
parameters change the effective learning model, for example, number of hidden units, weight decay 
terms etc. 
The training of the network is to find a set of weights, w, that gives optimal map between the training 
set and the predicted set. The learned weights are expected to fit well to new examples. Plain back-
propagation learns by performing gradient descent to optimize the error function. More efficient 
optimization techniques may also be used, such as conjugate gradients or variable metric methods. 
Figure 2 shows the method of selecting optimal number of hidden neuron using the correlation 
coefficients at each stage. 
However there are certain disadvantages of using back propagation networks:   
1. It can over fit the given data.  
2. It needs large datasets to correctly map the relationship between the input and outputs. 
As explained above, it is seen that although back propagation neural networks are very reliable, they 
often suffer with the problem of over fitting the experimental data. Over-fitting problem or poor 
generalization of the given dataset happens when a network over-learns during the training period. The 
result is a “too well-trained” model, which may not perform well on unseen data. This problem is known 
as Occam’s razor problem (MacKay 1992). The principle is that unnecessarily complex models should 
not be preferred than the simpler ones. In order to address this issue, the method of ‘Bayesian inference’ 
is used which automatically addresses the Occam’s razor problem. 
According to the fundamentals of the Bayesian analysis, the plausibility of alternative hypothesis is 
represented by probabilities, and inference is performed by evaluating those probabilities. Thus, using 
Bayesian probability theory it is possible to automatically infer the flexibility of a model warranted by 
the data. The model can be evaluated by using the simple Bayes rule given by 
𝑃 (
𝐻𝑖
𝐷⁄ ) =
𝑃(𝐻𝑖)𝑃(
𝐷
𝐻𝑖⁄
)
𝑃(𝐷)
     (2) 
Where the denominator P (D) is the normalizing constant which makes the final belief add up to 1. 
Bayesian Regularization approach minimizes the over-fitting problem by taking into account the 
‘goodness-of-fit’ as well as the network architecture. Hence in this work the Bayesian regularization 
approach is used for better fitness of the data. The neural network toolbox of MATLAB software 
package is used for training and testing the given data. Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm with Bayesian 
regularization function (trainbr) has been used to train the network. The network architecture is obtained 
for which the network has minimum sum of squares of errors (SSE) and also has better generalization 
ability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Selecting optimal number of hidden neurons for BR-ANN 
 Figure 3: Architecture of Neural Network for Botnet Detection 
The fifteen features are the input, and output is the class label indicating the nature of the flow. The 
input is first normalized from 0.05 to 0.95 using the following equation for transfer function to activate 
efficiently as the tan sigmoid function is used for mapping from the weighted inputs to the output. 
𝑥𝑛 = 0.05 + 0.9 ∗
(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
(𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)
⁄  
Where xmin and xmax are the minimum and maximum values of x and xn is the normalized data of the 
corresponding x. Once the best trained network is found, all the transformed data returns to their original 
value using the following equation: 
𝑥 = 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 + (𝑥𝑛 − 0.05) ∗ (𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛)/0.9 
 
 
3.3 Algorithm used and pseudo-code 
The entire code is divided into two modules. One module is the getConversations method and the 
other is testtshark method. getConversations reads from the specified pcap files and invokes Netmate 
to extract flow statistics from the pcap file which are used to build the BR-ANN model. Testtshark is 
the real-time module which uses jnetpcap to extract the same features out of live traffic and submits the 
flows to the Matlab-Weka-API for classification.  
 
 getConversations() 
   ________________________________________________________________________ 
1. BEGIN 
2. invoke Netmate 
a. packet properties are extracted and buffered 
b. packets are characterised as flows and their 44 statistics are   
calculated 
c. statistics are written into csv file 
3. csv file converted to arff file by adding Attribute and Data headers 
4. Instances in the arff file divided into 90% training data and 10% 
testing data; sent to the MATLAB BR-ANN code as input to train the 
model 
5. Trained model is imported into Weka using MATLAB-WEKA API 
6. END 
 
testtshark() 
        ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. BEGIN 
2. packet capture started on the wire using tshark 
3. jnetPcap invoked 
a. get packet properties of every packet 
b. send the packets to a buffer 
c. group on <source_ip, destination_ip, source_port, 
destination_port, protocol> to form flows.  
d. Calculate flow statistics for each of the keys in the above 
step 
e. Write the flow statistics to another buffer converting them 
into instances of test data 
4. Send the Instances to Weka API to test against the loaded training 
model 
a. If instance is malicious 
i. Flag the class label to be malicious 
ii. Make a note of the time stamp 
iii. Search for the packet containing this time stamp and 
write it to a separate pcap file.  
b. If instance is non-malicious 
i. Ignore and continue 
5. Send the pcaps classified as malicious to an IDS/IPS/Firewall for 
further actions 
6. END 
4. Experimental Setup   
4.1 Collecting Dataset  
The test-bed for this research work consists of a standalone network of Linux systems. The systems 
were connected to an Access switch in order to form the standalone network. On top of each of these 
physical machines, the authors ran virtual machines with Windows XP as the operating system. On 
these virtual machines, samples of Kelihos-Hlux, Zeus, Waledac were deployed. This setup is shown 
in figure 4. The samples of these malware were obtained from (contagiodump.blogspot.in and 
openmalware.com). The network activity of these malware samples were monitored for 48 hours each 
and the activity was captured by Wireshark. After collecting packet traces of the network activity of 
each of the malware, right from the infection stage to the attack stage, the pcap files were stored in the 
database server for further analysis.  
The ‘malicious dataset’ contained a total of 55,824 flows. In order to achieve proper classification, 
benign traffic consisting of traffic from p2p applications, ftp transfers, telnet sessions, video streaming 
and mobile updates was collected by the authors, and flows were extracted in the same manner as for 
malicious traffic. The entire dataset was merged and given to the machine learning algorithm for model 
generation (described in Section 3.2). 
 
 
Figure 4: Testbed for Capturing Malicious Network Activity 
4.2 Real-time Botnet Detection 
For real-time detection of botnet activity in the network, a module was deployed on a system which 
was receiving mirrored traffic from the entire network, as shown in figure 5. This module utilizes tshark 
to read the packets and stores them in libpcap format in chunks of 200 MB each. The stored packet 
captures are converted into conversations (or flows). Each flow is an instance which is to be monitored 
for malicious activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The test-bed used for deploying the P2P Botnet Detection Module 
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 The Bayesian Neural Network model, whose training was described in the previous section on 
methodology, was inherited using Matlab-Weka Interface API in order to test the flows against the 
trained model in real-time. According to the classification done by the trained model, only those flows 
(and thus only those packets) which are marked malicious by the algorithm are saved into a separate 
pcap file. All this is done in real-time thereby giving an indication on the botnet activity in a network’s 
present state. This module, shown in figure 6, can serve as a good pre-processing module for any 
IDS/IPS to detect Botnet traffic and flag an alert for the same. The working snapshot of the model is 
shown in figure 7, running on eclipse IDE. 
 
Figure 6: Overview of Building the BR-ANN Module 
 
Figure 7: Screenshot of Real-Time P2P Botnet Detection Module in Action 
5. Results and Future Scope of Work 
The exact sequence of steps used in this real-time P2P Botnet detection module are shown in figure 8: 
Real-Time Detection
Java Module for P2P Bot Detection
Building Br-ANN Model
Training +Testing Sets Bayesian ANN Model
LibPcap Network Capture
P2P Bot Flow Extraction P2P and other Benign
 Figure 8: Overview of Real-time Deployment of the Detection Module 
Correlation between two variables X and Y is measured using the Pearson product-moment coefficient, 
which takes the value between -1 and +1 inclusive. It is defined by the formula: 
𝑟 =
∑ (𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?)
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑌𝑖 − ?̿?)
√∑ (𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
√∑ (𝑌𝑖 − ?̅?)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The ideal prediction is supposed to generate a straight line passing through origin at an angle of 45 
degrees, as the X-axis and Y-axis represent the experimental and predicted values by each of the 
methods employed. It is observed that the correlation coefficient is very near to 1. This shows that the 
goodness of fit of the model generated by Bayesian Regularized ANN is close to exact prediction.  
90% of the data is considered as training data and remaining 10% is considered testing data to validate 
the goodness of fit of the model generated. The correlation obtained by the network trained is very high 
and is equal to 0.9931. When tested on bots which were not used in the training set, with samples 
obtained from CAIDA (The CAIDA UCSD Network Telescope "Three Days Of Conficker" -21st 
December 2009) and ISOT (Saad, et al. July 19-21, 2011), the BR-ANN model gave a correlation of 
0.9902. These results are given below in the box plot and the histogram respectively in figures 9 and 
10. A box plot can be used to graphically show groups of quantitative data through their five number 
summaries: the smallest observation (sample minimum), lower quartile (Q1), median (Q2), upper 
quartile (Q3), and largest observation (sample maximum). C1 depicts the deviation in experimental 
results and C2 depicts the deviation in the predicted results. From the histogram it can be seen that the 
predicted number of instances in non-malicious and malicious is very close to the experimental number 
of instances and thus these two establish the working of the BR-ANN module. The scatter plot depicts 
the precision-recall characteristics of the model where Recall is on the x-axis and Precision on the y-
axis. Recall is the fraction of positive examples that are correctly labeled, whereas Precision measures 
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Flow Charecteristics 
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trained BR-ANN model
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further procesing
that fraction of examples classified as positive that are truly positive. Statistical tests of F-test and 
Levene’s test were performed in order to judge about the variance of the predicted values of the model 
compared with the experimental data. The results of the tests performed are provided in Tables. The 
significance value, p is observed to be more than 0.05 for 95 per cent confidence interval. Consequently 
it can be said that the Null hypotheses cannot be rejected. This means that the predictions of the Neural 
Network have satisfactory mapping to the experimental data. All the p-value are almost 0.9, indicating 
the model has good accuracy with the capability of generalization. This shows that the goodness of fit 
of the model generated by Bayesian Regularized ANN is statistically satisfactory and accurate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Statistical Test Values 
 
The prediction results were also verified with the logs of Cyberoam, a Unified Threat management 
system deployed at the authors’ organization and which is also in use in many corporate organizations. 
The packets flagged as malicious by the Bayesian Neural Network Detection Module were also flagged 
Method DF1 DF2 Statistic P-Value
F Test (normal) 75628 75628 1 0.847
Levene's Test (any continuous) 1 151256 0.22 0.641
Figure 10:Precision-Recall Plot of the Testing Data 
Figure 9: Accuracy measure of BR-ANN Model a) Box Plot b) Histograms 
by Cyberoam to be malicious, as shown in figure 11. This shows that the module build on BR-ANN 
can be built as an efficient pre-processing engine for existing IDS/IPS solutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this research, existing models of Machine Learning, in the context of P2P botnet detection, were 
studied. And a better model for Artificial Neural Networks based on Bayesian Regularization was 
proposed, which is very efficient in the problem context which need good generalization abilities. Thus 
it is conclusively shown through the statistical tests that the trained BR-ANN model is able to generalize 
very well and is able to predict the activity of unknown bots’ malicious activity.  
Detecting specifically the kind of malicious activity and thereby identifying the unknown bot could help 
the security experts to take appropriate preventive measures. Due to the large bandwidth of the network, 
shifting to scalable and distributed architecture is a very attractive alternative to consider. Integrating 
the existing API with Mahout and Hadoop APIs and re-writing the classifier to suit the Map-Reduce 
paradigm is the future scope of this work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Verification of Results with Cyberoam 
Packet flagged as malicious by BR-ANN Detection module and 
similar conversation being detected by Cyberoam 
Figure 11: BR-ANN detection module’s results verified by the UTM Cyberoam 
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